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Max Grömping
Heidelberg University, Germany
Abstract
Although membership is declining, parties continue to perform roles central to democratic governance in modern
societies. Given this seeming paradox, we suggest that partisan identification, in complementing studies of formal
membership, is a promising way of assessing the strength of parties’ democratic linkage. Using data from an original
survey of voters in Australia and the United Kingdom, we analyse the participatory and demographic profiles of party
supporters. We show that there are significant differences between supporters and those not committed to any party, as
well as between supporters based on the strength of their party identification, substantiating the idea that parties can be
conceptualized as a series of concentric circles of increasing engagement but declining representativeness. Stronger
supporters are more likely to engage with parties online, volunteer and donate, but are older, more likely to be male
and less likely to be foreign-born. Our findings have important implications for democratic practice as parties seek to
expand and rejuvenate their networks of affiliates.
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In recent years, party organization research has shifted
from a primary concern with the characteristics, activities
and attitudes of party members to analysing a broader
category of party supporters.1 If parties are vehicles for
democratic linkage, providing both representative and
participatory opportunities to link citizens and the state
(Lawson, 1988: 14), this shift makes intuitive sense as
levels of formal membership decline, yet parties continue
to play significant roles in representative democracy and
governance. The shift also reflects ongoing organizational
adaptations undertaken by parties to extend participation
in what might have once been considered internal
decision-making processes, such as leadership selections,
to the public at large (Cross et al., 2016; Gauja, 2017;
Scarrow, 2015).
This article moves beyond the notion of formal party
membership to analyse the demographic profiles and par-
tisan activities of party supporters (i.e. those who identify
with a party) in two democracies: Australia and the United
Kingdom. We argue that the strength of a person’s party
identification is an appropriate analytical lens through
which to evaluate the participatory and representative link
between parties and the polity, complementing conven-
tional approaches that focus on formal membership. Build-
ing on Duverger’s (1964) metaphor of political parties as
concentric circles, we expect that as party support
increases, citizens become more engaged in partisan activ-
ities beyond the act of simply voting – for example, through
social media interaction, donating and volunteering.
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Our analysis is based on an original survey fielded to a
representative sample of voters in Australia and the United
Kingdom. We show that there are significant differences
between party supporters and those not committed to any
particular party, both in demographics and their level of
engagement (party membership, membership of other
groups, political participation, party activism and future
party activism). By demonstrating that partisan engage-
ment extends beyond the boundaries of formal member-
ship, and beyond the act of voting, our findings have
important implications for parties seeking to rejuvenate
their base in the context of membership decline.
The article proceeds in five sections. We begin by
locating our research within recent studies of partisan
supporters, which have built on a rich collection of party
membership surveys. We then outline our theoretical
framework, research design and data. Developing the idea
that political parties provide a link between state and soci-
ety, which involves both representative and participatory
dimensions, we analyse the demographic and participa-
tory profiles of party supporters. We conclude by discuss-
ing some of the broader implications of our research
findings for studies of party organization and the health
of party democracy.
Understanding partisan activity: From
members to supporters
The study of party members has been a central element of
party democracy scholarship. Members are important
because they provide legitimacy and resources to their
party, determine policy priorities, aid the process of polit-
ical recruitment and create a representative link to the
electorate (Scarrow, 2015: 102). While studies of party
membership have provided important insights into why,
and how, citizens engage with parties, they sit within a
normative conception of democracy that sees
membership-based parties as central to the operation of
representative politics (Allern and Pedersen, 2007: 70;
van Haute, 2011: 14–16; Whiteley et al., 1994: 7). As
almost all of this research relies on self-reported data from
political parties as to who ‘counts’ as a party member
(Ponce and Scarrow, 2016: 680), interest in membership
has been concerned primarily with the traits and activities
of those individuals who appear on parties’ membership
lists, with limited consideration of the significance of
relying on this formal status and the scale of participatory
activity that it captures.
Scholars have, however, started to acknowledge more
fluid conceptions of party membership and shifting parti-
cipatory trends. For example, Ponce and Scarrow (2016)
argue the benefits of using ‘subjective’ measures of mem-
bership (i.e. self-reported partisan behaviour from surveys
such as the European Social Survey and the International
Social Survey Program) rather than ‘objective’ figures
provided by political parties in establishing a comparative
agenda for party membership studies that can be used in
countries without mass membership traditions, and as suit-
able for analysing the impact of new forms of party affilia-
tion. In recent years, political parties have undertaken
organizational reforms and created participatory opportu-
nities that challenge the very notion of formal party mem-
bership, prompting the recognition that forms of partisan
affiliation beyond formal membership matter (Gauja, 2015;
Scarrow, 2015). Parties, for example, have encouraged the
participation of non-members in policy development, as
well as leadership and candidate selection through pri-
maries (see e.g. Cross et al., 2016; Sandri et al., 2015). In
Australia, the Labor and National parties have experimen-
ted with ‘community pre-selections’, an open candidate
selection model copied from the UK Conservatives (Gauja,
2017). They have created multiple modes of affiliation,
many of which aim to harness online channels for partici-
pation and communication (Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2017;
Scarrow, 2015: 135–145). UK Labour, for instance, estab-
lished a network of registered supporters and allowed for
policy participation through online consultative forums
(Gauja, 2017). In some instances, parties have even set
thresholds for membership so low that a distinctive cate-
gory of party member becomes meaningless (Bolleyer
et al., 2015). In light of these developments, an exclusive
focus on formal party members may not reveal a complete
picture of partisan activity in contemporary society (Fisher
et al., 2014: 77; Webb et al., 2017: 64).
Several studies have extended the analysis of partisan
activities beyond party members to supporters. The pri-
mary intellectual interest here has been comparing these
two groups. Studies have found that supporters are an
important source of labour during election campaigns,
although members are more likely to engage in campaign
activities (Fisher et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2017) and, over-
all, are more politically active (Hooghe and Kölln, 2020).
Party members differ from supporters in some of their
demographic characteristics: They are more likely to be
better educated, male and radical (Faucher and Boy, 181–
182; Webb et al., 2017: 67), with less variation seen
between inactive members and party supporters (Gauja and
Jackson, 2016).
These studies highlight the importance of recalibrating
our approach to party organization away from one based on
rigid membership boundaries towards achieving a more
dynamic picture of parties comprised of various sites of
affiliation. Although this approach is certainly not new –
Duverger (1964) and Key (1958) distinguished between
different categories of party followers more than half a
century ago – it has particular resonance today given the
pervasive downward trend in ‘formal’ party membership
(see e.g. Poguntke et al., 2016: 667; van Haute et al., 2017)
and the organizational permeability noted above (Bolleyer,
2009; Katz and Mair, 2009). This decline is often
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characterized as reflecting membership organizations in
crisis, rather than prompting a re-examination of the con-
cepts of membership and partisan engagement – and
whether the theoretical and empirical indicators that we
rely on are still suitable.
Theoretical framework and research
design
Looking beyond party membership and understanding the
socio-demographic characteristics and participatory activ-
ities of supporters gives us a complementary view of the
‘health’ of partisan engagement and party politics today.
We conceptualize the party organization broadly – as a
series of concentric circles that carry different ‘types’ of
affiliates who differ in their partisan activities and the
strength of their commitment to the party (Duverger,
1964). Duverger distinguished between militants, mem-
bers, supporters and electors in his concentric circles
model, but also acknowledged the fluidity of these cate-
gories, suggesting that while a party supporter can be
distinguished from a member by virtue of the fact that she
‘remains outside the organisation and the community it
forms’, as soon as that difference is examined more
closely ‘it blurs and at times disappears’ (1964: 62). And
as Susan Scarrow warns, the consequences of adopting too
rigid distinctions ‘obscures some of the most interesting
aspects of party life: the movement between, and overlap
among, these circles’ (2015: 28; see also Lisi and Cancela,
2019: 391).
To avoid perpetuating the formal boundaries of party
organization in our analysis, we adopt the metaphor of
parties as concentric circles but use the notion of party
identification (rather than militants, members, etc.) to iden-
tify different ‘types’ of party adherents, which we term
supporters. Supporters are identified by the following ques-
tions. First, respondents were asked, ‘generally speaking,
do you usually think of yourself as . . . ’, with a number of
different party names available to choose from. Second,
those who selected a party were asked: ‘and would you call
yourself a very strong, fairly strong, fairly weak or very
weak supporter of that party?’ Based on the common for-
mulation and responses, we are left with two types of sup-
porter: ‘strong supporters’ and ‘regular supporters’, as well
as a third category: the ‘non-committed’.
As a tool for identifying types of supporters, party iden-
tification is advantageous as it transcends traditional organi-
zational boundaries and is independent of membership
altogether. It is a measure used widely in national election
studies and surveys of participation, enhancing the compara-
tive potential of the research design. Furthermore, previous
research has shown a link between the strength of partisan-
ship and campaign mobilization, particularly voting (see e.g.
Dalton, 2000: 21; Dalton et al., 2000: 54–59), suggesting it
might also be relevant to understanding a broader range of
partisan activities, particularly those traditionally thought to
be within the purview of formal members.
To investigate the model of concentric circles of affilia-
tion that transcend party boundaries, we analyse whether
there are any discernible differences between party sup-
porters and the non-committed, and whether there are dif-
ferences between regular and strong supporters. As our aim
is to move away from pre-assumed categories of affiliation,
we are not concerned with examining the differences
between members and supporters.
We compare the socio-demographic characteristics of
our three groups because they tell us something of the
representative capacities of political parties. One of the
most consistent findings of party membership studies is that
party members do not reflect the broader population: They
are disproportionately male, middle-aged, middle-class and
better educated. This disconnection has largely been attrib-
uted to the effect of resources and specific individual char-
acteristics (sex, age, education, income, etc.) on affiliation
and levels of party activity (see van Haute and Gauja, 2015: 7).
We therefore expect the demographic characteristics of
strong party supporters to differ from regular supporters
and the non-committed. Strong party supporters should
be older, more likely to be male, born in Australia/the
United Kingdom, better educated and of a higher socio-
economic standing. However, a more representative body
of party supporters has positive implications for the capac-
ity of parties to function as policy conduits and play an
ambassadorial role in the community.
Our motivation for studying the political engagement
of party supporters and the non-committed relates to the
participatory element of party linkage. Here we aim to
take the debate on participation further than just party
members – to evaluate the types of participatory profiles
observed beyond the formal boundaries of the party orga-
nization. We study five dimensions of engagement: party
membership, other group membership, political participa-
tion, party activism and future party activism. We expect
overall levels of political activism and party activism to be
higher among strong supporters, when compared to regu-
lar supporters and the non-committed. There are three
reasons for this.
First, strong identification with a political party adds
psychological and social network incentives to other, pre-
existing incentives for political engagement (e.g. political
dissatisfaction) (Finkel and Opp, 1991). For instance, a
strong identifier will want to adhere to the norms and beha-
viours in their peer-group and will likely be more receptive
to party elites’ call to action than non-committed individ-
uals. Second, previous research has shown that ideological
congruence between members and parties is positively
related to degrees of activism (Lisi and Cancela, 2019; Polk
and Kölln, 2017; van Haute and Carty, 2012). Insofar as
strength of party identification taps into a similar (albeit
perceived) connection between parties and their adherents,
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we would expect our findings to run in the same direction.
Third, if the demographic profile of party supporters is
indeed of one of older, more educated and more resourceful
citizens, then the standard expectation of the resource
mobilization thesis would lead us to believe that these cit-
izens show higher levels of political engagement across the
board (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In sum, we should there-
fore expect levels of political engagement – engagement
with parties, and general engagement – to increase with the
strength of party identification.
Of course, a host of contextual factors simultaneously
drive variation in the strength of party identification as well
as variation in political engagement at the aggregate level.
For instance, majoritarian electoral systems and their ten-
dency towards two-party systems may increase the overall
strength of party identification (Bowler et al., 1994), highly
institutionalized party systems may provide the basis for
overall stronger party identification (Dalton and Weldon,
2007) and so forth. Differences in the demographic and
participatory profiles of party supporters could easily be
artefacts of those contextual factors in the specific case.
At the very least, we expect that any differences between
individuals of differing levels of party identification would
remain stable across political systems with very similar
macro-institutional settings. We therefore, include two
such cases in our analysis. Australia and the United King-
dom are similar in terms of the electoral system, the degree
of party system institutionalization or party de-alignment,
comparable long-term rates of formal membership decline,
as well as a large number of other institutional variables,
including minimal legal restrictions on the participatory
opportunities available to non-members. Including both
countries in the study thus allows us to hold these aggregate
intervening factors constant and focus on the individual-
level differences between party supporters and non-
committed citizens. We should expect to see little variation
between Australia and the United Kingdom, and if that is
indeed the case, our argument is strengthened.
Data
Our analysis of party engagement is based on responses to
an online survey of a representative sample of eligible vot-
ers in Australia and the United Kingdom, fielded in
February 2016. Respondents were drawn from a large
panel recruited by international market research firm
IPSOS, and their responses were anonymized.2 The ques-
tionnaires asked respondents their opinion about their
party identification, strength of political party support,
political engagement (partisan and non-partisan), and their
socio-demographic profile (see the Online Appendix).
While surveys have been widely used to ascertain the par-
tisan engagement and characteristics of party members,
few studies have examined these questions among individ-
uals outside the formal party organization (van Haute,
2011: 8–10). The survey is therefore novel in its orienta-
tion, drawing on findings from other literatures in the fields
of political participation, communication and social
movement studies that incorporate broader notions of par-
ticipation and engagement and reflect, for example, tech-
nological advances and evolving forms of political
citizenship (Faucher, 2015).
The sample contained 3,631 valid responses: 2,419
from Australia and 1,212 from the United Kingdom (see
Figure 1). Of those, 49% have been classified as ‘non-com-
mitted’ (expressing fairly weak or very weak support for
any political party, were uncertain or explicitly professed
that they support ‘no party’).3 A further 39% expressed
Figure 1. Distribution of party supporters and non-committed in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Note: N ¼ 3,631. Circles drawn to scale, with area of each band ¼ N of respective group.
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‘fairly strong’ support for a political party and were classi-
fied as ‘regular supporters’, whereas 13% voiced ‘very
strong’ support, and where hence classified as ‘strong sup-
porters’.4 All analyses were weighted by age, gender, loca-
tion, place of birth and employment type to correct for any
differences between the sample and national distributions
in terms of demographics.
The demographic characteristics of party
supporters and the non-committed
The descriptive demographics of party supporters and non-
committed voters in both countries are displayed in Table 1.
Looking at the total for both countries taken together, and
ignoring country differences, it becomes clear that the three
groups differ from each other in important, statistically
significant, ways.5
In terms of sex, our findings align with research that has
identified a gender imbalance among party members when
compared to supporters and the general population (Gauja
and Jackson, 2016: 372; van Haute and Gauja, 2015: 194–
195; Webb et al., 2017: 67). Women are slightly under-
represented among regular (47%) and strong supporters
(45%), when compared to the non-committed (55%) – a
pattern identical in both countries. Among the larger par-
ties, the under-representation of women supporters is most
acute in the Liberal Party of Australia and the UK Conser-
vatives. A similar trend of disproportion is also evident
with respect to age, place of birth and employment. The
mean age of party supporters (48) is older when compared
to the non-committed (45). Almost three-quarters of all
respondents (73% in total) report having been born in Aus-
tralia/United Kingdom. This percentage is significantly
higher among regular party supporters (76%) and strong
party supporters (78%) and is a prominent among
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of party supporters and non-committed voters in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Non-committed
(% ‘yes’)
Regular supporters
(% ‘yes’)
Strong supporters
(% ‘yes’) Total (% ‘yes’)
N
AUS UK Both AUS UK Both AUS UK Both AUS UK Both
Sex (V ¼ 0.09)***
Male 45 43 45 52 54 53 55 56 55 49 49 49 1,784
Female 55 57 55 48 46 47 45 44 45 51 51 51 1,847
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,631
Age (V ¼ 0.09)***
18–29 25 22 24 21 17 19 15 24 18 22 20 21 773
30–44 29 28 28 25 23 24 27 20 25 27 25 26 957
45–64 31 32 31 31 31 31 36 39 37 32 32 32 1,161
65þ 15 18 16 24 29 26 22 17 20 19 22 20 740
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,631
Born in AUS/UK (V ¼ 0.08)***
Yes 63 81 69 70 87 76 74 86 78 67 84 73 2,645
No 37 19 31 30 13 24 26 14 22 33 16 27 986
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,631
Education (V ¼ 0.05)***
Primary schooling (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (2) (1) (2) (64)
Secondary schooling 34 40 36 32 38 34 29 32 30 32 38 34 1,246
University education 40 38 39 41 39 41 49 49 49 42 40 41 1,491
Other tech. or prof. qual 24 21 23 25 21 24 19 16 18 24 21 23 830
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,631
Employment (V ¼ 0.11)***
Full time (>30 h) 41 42 41 43 43 43 45 53 47 42 44 43 1,548
Part time (8–29 h) 15 17 16 16 11 14 19 9 16 16 14 15 554
Part time (<8 h) (3) (3) (3) (3) (2) (2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 99
Unemployed 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 134
Full-time home 9 6 8 5 6 5 5 3 4 7 5 6 227
In education 6 4 5 4 2 3 1 6 3 5 3 4 156
Retired 16 20 17 24 31 26 23 21 22 20 24 21 772
Other 6 5 5 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 141
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,631
Note: N ¼ 3,631. Results weighted by age, gender, location, place of birth and employment type. Percentages within parentheses are computed on
categories with few observations (<100) and should be interpreted with caution. Reporting Cramér’s V and p value of CMH test for repeated tests of
independence. CMH: Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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respondents identifying with the Scottish National Party
(SNP) and the UK Independence Party (with 100% and
98% born in the United Kingdom, respectively). While
we see notable differences between the United Kingdom
and Australia, with the latter having many more foreign-
born voters, the pattern is similar in both countries. Strong
supporters are most likely to be in full time employment,
and retirees are more common among regular (26%) and
strong (22%) supporters, when compared to the non-
committed (17%). There is less variation among supporters
and non-committed voters in terms of educational attain-
ment. The only noteworthy variation was between the level
of university education held by strong supporters (49%)
compared to all respondents (41%).
In general, strong party supporters differ most from the
non-committed, with regular party supporters taking up a
position between the two extremes. On average, the typ-
ical party supporter is more likely to be male, older and to
be born in the country, than the typical non-committed
citizen. Confirming our initial expectation, strong party
supporters are more likely to have enjoyed university edu-
cation, to be retired and to work part-time than both reg-
ular supporters and the non-committed. The fact that these
differences hold up to statistical tests measuring associa-
tion (ignoring the stratification by country for now) sug-
gests that distinguishing citizens based on the strength of
their support to political parties is a useful analytical cate-
gory. It also begs the question whether these distinct
groups equally differ in terms of other characteristics –
and here we turn to political engagement.
Political engagement
Our second expectation was that overall levels of political
and party activism should be higher among strong support-
ers when compared to regular supporters and the non-
committed. Table 2 presents reported group differences in
organizational membership, political participation and
party activism. For each subset (non-committed, regular
supporters, strong supporters), the table shows the percent-
age of respondents who are members of a particular orga-
nization or engage in a given activity, respectively, split by
country and as a total for both countries. The number in
each cell is a relative proportion of respondents within the
given subset and does not relate to the overall size of the
subset itself.6
Party membership
The first finding is hardly surprising: Party supporters are
much more likely to be members of political parties than
non-committed citizens. Two-and-a-half times as many
regular supporters and 10 times as many strong supporters
have joined a party than non-committed individuals. These
differences are robust. Still, given that only 6% of the
overall population are in fact party members, joiners are
the clear minority in all three groups. While the pattern of
increasing membership among these three groups is the
same in both Australia and the United Kingdom, there are
stark differences between the two countries. Overall party
membership is much higher in the United Kingdom (9%
compared to 5% in Australia), reaching as high as 42%
among strong party supporters, although some caution is
necessary as membership here is substantially higher than
other reported ‘formal’ membership figures from the
Political Parties Database Project and Members and Acti-
vists of Political Parties data sets.7 These results suggest
that UK parties are much more effective in converting
support into membership and correspond with recent
trends (since 2014) of membership growth – particularly
among the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and the
SNP (Audickas et al., 2018).
Group membership
Membership in other organizations ranges from 17% in
local community organizations to 9% in social justice and
peace groups (e.g. Oxfam). Group membership is uni-
formly highest among the strong party supporters, with
regular supporters taking up an intermediate position. The
percentage of members in any given category increases by
a magnitude of approximately 1.5–2 times from non-
committed to regular supporters and by the same magni-
tude from regular to strong supporters. This suggests that
strong supporters are on average prolific joiners, engaged
in a wide spectrum of groups, while less committed party
supporters are on average more selective. Differences
between the countries are clearly visible, insofar as UK
voters tend to join organizations at a higher rate, and which
may reflect Australia’s supposedly more ‘passive’ political
culture (Jaensch, 1997). Group membership is most preva-
lent among Green party identifiers in both Australia and the
United Kingdom, particularly with respect to environmen-
tal groups and online advocacy organizations.
Political participation
A similar pattern holds when looking at different types of
political participation. Across the board, it is more preva-
lent in the United Kingdom than in Australia. However,
projected onto the different groups of party supporters,
patterns of participation are very similar. The share of
strong party supporters who report having engaged in dif-
ferent activities over the past 2 years is on average two to
three times more than that of the non-committed, and still
on average 1.5 times higher than among regular party sup-
porters. For instance, whereas only 7% of non-committed
citizens had partaken in protests, marches or demonstra-
tions, 12% of regular supporters and 23% of strong sup-
porters had done so. Again, Green party identifiers in both
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Australia and the United Kingdom are the most active in
their political participation. The only form of participation
where regular and strong party supporters do not differ
much is petition-signing.
Partisan participation
Becoming a member is only one way to engage with polit-
ical parties. Here, the survey instrument was designed to
tap into a range of partisan activities that are not restricted
to the membership but can be undertaken by the public at
large: visiting a party website, ‘friending’ or ‘liking’ a party
on social media, sharing a party message on social media,
joining a mailing list, volunteering, donating and wearing
or displaying a logo. These items cover both high- and low-
intensity forms of participation, including both online and
offline activities provided by all political parties in both
democracies. Again, average engagement rates among both
types of party supporters far surpass those of the non-
committed citizens (and the population average). Online
forms of engagement, such as visiting a party’s website
or ‘friending’ or ‘liking’ their social media profile, are the
most frequent types of activity undertaken. Other than these
activities, non-committed citizens hardly engage in any
Table 2. Political engagement of party supporters and non-committed in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Non-committed
(% ‘yes’)
Regular
supporters
(% ‘yes’)
Strong
supporters
(% ‘yes’) All (% ‘yes’)
AUS UK Both AUS UK Both AUS UK Both AUS UK Both N V
Party membershipa
Any political party 2 1 2 4 9 5 16 42 23 5 9 6 221 0.29***
Other group membershipa
Local community org. 12 15 13 16 22 18 24 32 27 15 20 17 613 0.12***
Trade union 10 16 12 14 18 15 21 33 24 13 19 15 539 0.11***
Environmental group 6 7 6 12 12 12 21 31 24 10 12 11 389 0.19***
Online advocacy group 6 8 7 10 14 11 20 31 23 10 13 11 387 0.17***
Cause group 6 10 7 10 17 12 17 29 20 9 14 11 392 0.15***
Social justice/peace org. 6 4 5 9 11 9 21 27 23 9 9 9 329 0.20***
Political participationb
Signed petition 34 42 37 46 54 49 47 70 54 41 50 44 1,581 0.14***
Contacted politician/official 18 21 19 27 36 30 40 51 43 24 30 26 955 0.19***
Boycotted products 17 19 18 23 26 24 32 35 33 21 23 22 798 0.13***
Posted polit. comment online 13 13 13 21 24 22 34 43 37 19 21 20 714 0.20***
Worked with people 11 11 11 19 23 20 31 44 35 17 19 18 639 0.21***
Taken part in protest 8 6 7 12 11 12 20 30 23 11 11 11 406 0.16***
Party activismb
Visited website 17 22 19 30 43 34 39 64 46 25 35 28 1,034 0.22***
‘Friended’ or ‘liked’ 11 10 10 23 23 23 34 57 40 19 20 19 696 0.26***
Shared message on social media 7 8 7 17 21 18 30 49 35 14 17 15 554 0.26***
Joined mailing list 6 6 6 14 23 17 31 51 37 13 18 14 525 0.29***
Done volunteer workc 6 4 5 13 12 13 27 42 31 12 12 12 428 0.26***
Donated moneyc 4 4 4 8 15 11 23 40 28 8 12 10 348 0.26***
Worn /displayed logo 3 4 3 9 13 10 17 49 26 7 12 9 329 0.26***
Future party activismd
Answer survey on issues that matter you 47 51 48 64 70 66 68 79 71 56 62 58 2,104 0.20***
Select leader 17 19 18 28 39 32 43 61 48 25 32 27 987 0.23***
Select local candidate 16 18 16 25 36 29 40 55 44 23 29 25 900 0.22***
Receive information 10 12 11 22 29 25 40 56 44 19 24 21 745 0.28***
Post idea online 12 12 12 21 22 22 35 51 40 19 21 19 701 0.23***
Attend policy forum/meeting 9 11 10 15 22 17 34 47 38 15 19 16 598 0.25***
Register as supporter 3 4 3 8 9 8 16 17 16 6 8 7 249 0.17***
Become member of party 3 4 3 8 9 8 16 17 16 6 8 7 249 0.17***
Note: N ¼ 3,631. Results weighted by age, gender, location, place of birth and employment type. Reporting Cramér’s V and p value of CMH test for
repeated tests of independence. CMH: Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
aPercentage of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question whether they were a member of a political party or other group.
bPercentage of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question whether they had undertaken a given activity within the past 2 years.
c’High intensity’ form of participation.
dPercentage of respondents who answered ‘likely’ to the question whether they would undertake a given activity in the future.
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party activism at all. Particularly rare are non-committed
persons who engage in ‘high-intensity’ activism, for
instance, volunteer work such as handing out ‘how to vote’
material (5%) or donating money (4%). While still being
much higher than among non-committed citizens, activism
rates also sharply drop off among regular supporters, from
34% who had visited a party’s website, to only 10% having
worn or displayed a party’s logo. In contrast, activism is
high across all categories among the strong supporters, with
every activity having been done by at least a quarter of this
group. In terms of specific parties, Green identifiers in the
United Kingdom are most likely to engage in social media
activity or volunteer, whereas Liberal Democrat identifiers
are more likely to donate money to the party. In Australia,
National Party identifiers stand out as most likely to under-
take a range of partisan activities. Looking at the country
totals, we again see that engagement is higher in the United
Kingdom than in Australia.
Future party activism
Finally, when asked about whether they would likely par-
take in party activity in the future, the three groups differed
most strongly from each other. This is particularly interest-
ing because this battery of questions was designed to inves-
tigate respondents’ attitudes to a sample of organizational
reforms that are characteristic of the trends towards ‘open-
ing up’ political parties in terms of affiliation options, can-
didate and leadership selection, as well as policy
development. In all categories of future activism, regular
supporters said 1.5–2 times more often than the non-
committed that they were likely to engage in a given activ-
ity. And strong supporters were yet another 1.5–2 times
more likely to say so. A vivid example is provided by the
responses to the question about participation in personnel
selection. Non-committed citizens were largely uninter-
ested in selecting either party leaders (18%) or local can-
didates (16%). In contrast, 32% of regular supporters and
even 48% of strong supporters said that, given the oppor-
tunity, they would likely engage in the selection of party
leaders, and 29% and 44%, respectively, said they would
engage in the selection of local candidates. In Australia, the
most interest came from National Party supporters – a party
that has experimented with open primaries for the selection
of parliamentary candidates. In the United Kingdom, the
greatest demand came from Liberal Democrat supporters.
This is a particularly interesting finding, given the party has
not traditionally involved its supporters in decision-
making, but at the 2018 conference leader Vince Cable
resolved to create a class of supporters enjoying a range
of entitlements, including selecting the party’s leader (Lib-
eral Democrats, 2018).
These and other responses about future activism clearly
show the desire of party supporters to engage in crucial orga-
nizational activities, often thought of as being reserved for the
formal party membership. By contrast, party membership
itself remains a relatively unpopular proposition: Only 3%
of uncommitted respondents indicated they would be likely
to join a party in the future, rising to 7% among regular
supporters and 16% among strong supporters. We also found
that there was limited enthusiasm for registering as a party
supporter – suggesting that this lighter form of affiliation may
not be as popular as many parties have hoped or that the
concept was not fully understood by the survey respondents.
Overall engagement
In addition to looking at the frequency of individual activ-
ities and group memberships, we also calculated an addi-
tive index of all 28 engagement items in the survey,
standardized to range from zero to one.8 In this instance,
a score of zero means that a respondent is not a member of
any organization, nor engages in any activity, while a score
of one means that the respondent has joined all possible
types of organizations and engages in all possible past or
future activities. The mean engagement score for non-
committed citizens is 0.10, meaning that the average non-
committed person engaged in about 10% of possible
activities and groups. In contrast, the mean for regular sup-
porters is 0.18, and for strong supporters, the mean is 0.25.
Figure 2 maps this engagement indicator onto group
means split by strength of party identification and by coun-
try. Mean levels of political engagement are higher in reg-
ular supporters compared to politically non-committed
citizens. And mean engagement of all types is yet higher
within strong supporters compared to both other groups.9
And while overall engagement levels are higher in the
United Kingdom than in Australia, the observed pattern
of differences between supporter groups is exactly the same
in both countries.10
These results are robust when controlling for a range of
other factors in multiple regression. We model the raw
0.10
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Figure 2. Mean political engagement of party supporters and
non-committed in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Note: N ¼ 3,631. Mean ¼ mean score of additive index of 28
engagement indicators. Results weighted by age, gender, location,
place of birth and employment type. Reporting 95% confidence
interval.
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count of engagement activities (from 0 ¼ none to 28 ¼ all
possible activities) as an outcome of the strength of partisan
identification, sex, birth origin, employment, university
education and age. As the engagement index is highly
right-skewed with excess zeros, count models are best sui-
ted (Long, 1997). The negative binomial hurdle model
reported in Table 3 provides the best fit.11 The model com-
bines a part that explains the occurrence of no engagement
(zero component) with a part that explains the total count of
engagement activities if the threshold is passed (count
component). Negative coefficients in the zero component
indicate a higher likelihood of no engagement.
The model adds considerable nuance to the analysis in
three important ways. First, the demographic and socioe-
conomic factors shown to co-vary with the strength of par-
tisan support also explain a portion of the variation in
political engagement. Being male is associated with higher
engagement, being born in Australia/UK increases the like-
lihood of exhibiting some engagement (as opposed to
none), age reduces engagement, and being university edu-
cated increases the likelihood of engagement in old people,
but not in young ones.
Second, looking at the count component, we see that the
previous findings hold, even when accounting for demo-
graphic and socioeconomic attributes known to drive polit-
ical engagement. Namely, when compared to the reference
group of regular supporters, strong supporters are on aver-
age more engaged, and the non-committed are significantly
less engaged. This supports the model of concentric circles.
The coefficients are statistically significant and substan-
tively stronger than any other model variables.
Third, looking at the zero component shows that being
non-committed is by far the strongest factor explaining
whether a respondent exhibits any political engagement
whatsoever. On the other hand, the difference between reg-
ular and strong supporters is not significant in this regard.
This suggests a threshold effect, in that partisan identifica-
tion (of any strength) increases the likelihood of engage-
ment and that strong partisan identification maximizes
engagement beyond that threshold.
Conclusion
This article began with the premise that as formal levels of
party membership decline, perhaps we ought to look
beyond members to assess parties’ links with society today.
Conceptualizing parties as series of concentric circles
encapsulating different strengths of affiliation and
acknowledging the porous boundaries of party organiza-
tion, we examined the participatory and demographic char-
acteristics of party supporters in Australia and the United
Kingdom. Utilizing original survey data, we distinguished
between three groups on the basis of the strength of their
party identification: strong supporters, regular supporters
and the non-committed.
Our data revealed significant differences in the demo-
graphic characteristics between strong and regular support-
ers, as well as between these groups and the full sample.
The most notable differences were seen in age, sex,
employment and place of birth. Applying the idea of parties
as concentric circles, those most central (i.e. with the stron-
gest levels of party identification) are also the more unre-
presentative. The implications for parties’ representative
capacities are mixed. The fact that demographic differences
lessen as we move out from the nucleus of the party has
Table 3. Explaining political engagement in Australia and the
United Kingdom.
Dependent variable:
Political engagement
index (0–28)
Count component
Coefficient (Std.Err.)
Intercept 2.27 (0.09)***
Strength of party ID
Regular supporter (reference)
Non-committed 0.38 (0.03)***
Strong supporter 0.45 (0.04)***
Sex ¼ Female 0.12 (0.03)***
Born in AUS/UK 0.05 (0.04)
Full-time employment 0.02 (0.03)
Age 0.01 (0.00)***
University educated 0.07 (0.09)
Age  University 0.00 (0.00)þ
Log (theta) 2.18
Zero component
Intercept 1.21 (0.25)***
Strength of party ID
Regular supporter (reference)
Non-committed 0.83 (0.10)***
Strong supporter 0.16 (0.16)
Sex ¼ Female 0.11 (0.09)
Born in AUS/UK 0.41 (0.10)***
Full-time employment 0.00 (0.09)
Age 0.00 (0.00)
University educated 0.06 (0.27)
Age  University 0.01 (0.01)*
AIC 19326.5
BIC 19456.7
Log likelihood 9642.3
RMSE 6.597
Number of observations 3631
Number of groups (countries) 2
Var: Countries: Count (Intercept) 0.005
SD: Countries: Count (Intercept) 0.069
Var: Countries: Zero (Intercept) 0.029
SD: Countries: Zero (Intercept) 0.169
Note: N ¼ 3,631. Negative binomial hurdle model with random effect for
country. SD: standard deviation; RMSE: root of the mean-squared error;
AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; þp < 0.1
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potentially positive implications for democracy as political
parties seek to extend participatory opportunities and
affiliation options beyond the traditional formal mem-
bership. However, it appears that while extending parti-
cipatory opportunities beyond the membership might
capture a more diverse universe of citizens, those sup-
porters who identify more strongly with the party are
also the least representative.
In terms of their participatory profiles, our expectation
that engagement would be highest among strong support-
ers, followed by regular supporters and then the non-
committed, was confirmed by the data. Here the story is
perhaps more positive for parties: Even though party iden-
tification is declining over time (Dalton, 2004: 31–34,
2000), a much larger proportion of voters still identify with
political parties than want to join them as formal members.
And a significant percentage of those who identify as
strong supporters (and to a lesser extent regular supporters)
engage with parties in variety of ways. For example, they
follow parties online, receive and distribute partisan infor-
mation, volunteer, donate and show their affective support
for their chosen party (by e.g. displaying a party logo).
While many believe that, based on declining membership
numbers, the participatory link between political parties
and the population is broken; we are cautiously more opti-
mistic about the future based on the engagement profiles of
partisan identifiers.
Some specific findings are worth highlighting. We
found, for example, that strong supporters were also most
likely to be members of other organizations. If we think
about group membership as a way in which supporters can
act as policy conduits, joining up a range of groups in civil
society, then these disproportionately high rates of mem-
bership may act to offset the relative unrepresentativeness
of this group of adherents. An interesting avenue for future
research might be to examine the diversity of these mem-
berships in greater detail, to ascertain whether – for exam-
ple – supporters’ reach extends to organizations that might
not be usually associated with particular political parties, or
sympathetic to them. A similar argument could be made for
the impact of other types of political engagement, such as
attending protests and signing petitions, which connect the
party – through its supporters – to a wider network of policy
positions and political actions.
One of the most salient findings of our research, with
respect to the trajectory of opening up party organizations,
was the clear difference between non-committed voters,
regular party supporters and strong party supporters in the
likelihood that they would engage in party activities in the
future. As we move from the non-committed to regular and
then strong party supporters, respondents’ interest in under-
taking future party activities substantially increases. These
trends are consistent with the engagement patterns identi-
fied above and suggest that as parties think about the future
of their organizations, they could potentially draw on a core
group of people who are unlikely to join as members, but
would participate, for example, in open primaries and
issues-based consultation. It also begs the contentious ques-
tion: do parties need formal members at all?
While our analysis was limited to Australia and the
United Kingdom, our research design could be extended
to examine party supporters’ demographic and participa-
tory profiles in other contexts. Of particular interest would
be whether the differences between adherents are as visible
in democracies where the boundaries of party membership
are less pronounced, for example, systems such as the
United States, Canada and Italy, or in countries where party
membership traditions remain comparatively strong, for
example, Austria, Belgium, Norway and Italy (see Webb
and Keith, 2017: 32–35). Within countries, a party-level
analysis might also be performed to explore differences
between traditional and organizationally innovative parti-
cipatory structures.
Overall, our findings show that the stronger party iden-
tification becomes the more active supporters become in
their participatory profiles. At the same time, however, the
representative congruence between supporters and the
broader public decreases. While this is something of a con-
tradiction for political parties that might value both an
inclusive and representative supporter base, it does suggest
that there is value in looking beyond the membership for a
more nuanced analysis of the participatory and representa-
tive links created and sustained by parties today.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Faucher and Boy (2018), Fisher et al.
(2014), Gauja and Jackson (2016), Hooghe and Kölln
(2020), Webb et al. (2017).
2. Recent research suggests that data obtained from online
panels are comparable in quality and representativeness to
data collected via other probability-based methodologies
administered through traditional means, for instance, via
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telephone or in-person (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014;
Stephenson and Crete, 2011).
3. Note that ‘non-committed’ includes a broader range of
respondents than those with no party identification. The per-
centage of respondents who indicated that they did not iden-
tify with any political party was 17% (Australia) and 16%
(the United Kingdom). This is broadly comparable to results
from the 2016 Australian Election Study (19%) and the 2017
British Social Attitudes Survey (12%).
4. A quota set in the sampling procedure required half of the
respondents to be ‘non-committed’ and the other half to be
‘supporters’ (whether strong or not). While this quota was
imposed to ensure a large enough sample size to analyse
subgroups, the actual distribution of ‘party supporters’ versus
‘non-committed’ respondents was unknown. Therefore, to
ensure our weighted survey sample reflected the distribution
of these two discrete groups in the community, had no quotas
been applied, data from the screening questions from those
who completed the survey as well as those who were screened
out due to the quota being full were used to understand the
incidence of ‘party supporters’ versus ‘non-committed’
respondents. This analysis showed that the distribution was
only skewed slightly towards ‘party supporters’ at 52%.
5. The table reports Cramér’s V, a measure of the strength of
association between two nominal variables (0 ¼ none, 1 ¼
complete association), and the p value of Cochran–Mantel–
Haenszel (CMH) tests for repeated tests of independence. The
CMH tests take into account the stratification of our data by
country. The significant results suggest that the null hypoth-
esis that demographic characteristics per group are indepen-
dent from each other, given the country, can be rejected – that
is, party support is significantly related to differences in
demographics, but not countries.
6. For instance, 221 of all 3,631 respondents (or 6%) report being
members of a political party. Out of these party members, 34
(or 15%) are non-committed, 73 (33%) regular supporters, and
114 (52%) strong supporters (not reported in Table 2). This
means that 2% of all non-committed individuals, 5% of all
regular supporters, and 23% of all strong supporters are party
members (reported in Table 2). CMH tests were conducted to
ascertain the significance of group differences, controlling for
the stratification by country. Cramér’s V serves as an indicator
of the strength of association. As it turns out, all group differ-
ences are highly statistically significant, with the association
measure ranging between 0.12 and 0.29.
7. The Political Parties Database Project reports party member-
ship (as a percentage of the electorate) in the United Kingdom
at 0.98% and Australia at 1.67% (Poguntke et al., 2016: 668).
8. This additive procedure is supported by an exploratory factor
analysis, in which the reported Eigenvalue of factors drops
from 13.3 to 2.2 from the first to second factor. Factor scores
of this first underlying dimension of engagement correlate
very highly with the additive engagement index (r ¼ 0.97,
p < 0.001) and, additionally, the additive scale of 28 items
shows a very high Cronbach’s a of 0.91.
9. Specifically, mean engagement of strong party supporters in
both Australia (M ¼ 0.23, standard deviation (SD) ¼ 0.26)
and the United Kingdom (M ¼ 0.31, SD ¼ 0.23) is signifi-
cantly higher than mean engagement of regular supporters
(M ¼ 0.17, SD ¼ 0.18 and M ¼ 0.21, SD ¼ 0.20, respec-
tively). And this in turn is significantly higher than the mean
engagement of non-committed citizens (M ¼ 0.10, SD ¼ 0.
14; and M ¼ 0.12, SD ¼ 0.14, respectively). A significant
main effect of being a party supporter on levels of political
engagement is confirmed in two-way factorial analysis of
variance, F(2,3412)¼ 140.32, p < 0.001, ω2¼ 0.08 (‘medium
sized effect’ according to Kirk, 1996: 750).
10. The main effect of country on the level of engagement is
smaller than that of party identification, F(1,3412) ¼ 26.82,
p < 0.001, ω2 ¼ 0.01.
11. Online Appendix report a number of alternative models.
Hurdle-NB is found to have the best fit judged by log like-
lihood, Akaike information criterion, dispersion statistic
(theta) and the root mean square error.
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